What Determines the Exit Decision for Leveraged Buyouts? by Jenkinson, Tim & Sousa, Miguel
What determines the exit decision for leveraged buyouts?1
 
 
 
 
Tim Jenkinson 
Saïd Business School, University of Oxford and CEPR 
 
Miguel Sousa 
School of Economics and Management, University of Porto and CEF.UP 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
How and when to exit portfolio company investments are critical choices 
facing private equity funds. In this paper we analyze 1,022 European private 
equity exits, using information on fund and portfolio company 
characteristics, and on conditions in capital markets. For over 43% of the 
exits, private equity funds sold to each other and we analyze why such 
secondary buyouts have gained in popularity relative to IPOs and sales to 
corporate acquirers. We find that the exit route depends on various portfolio 
company characteristics, and that conditions in the debt and equity markets 
have a strong influence on exit choice. The existing literature has tended to 
portray the IPO is the “preferred” exit route. However, our analysis suggests 
this is mistaken: private equity funds take advantage of ‘windows of 
opportunity’, and the exit route that maximizes value varies with market 
conditions. 
 
 
Key words: Secondary buy-out, exits, private equity 
 
JEL: G11, G14, G24 
 
This version: May 2015 
  
                                               
1 Earlier versions of this paper were circulated under the title “Why Do Private Equity Firms Sell to Each 
Others?” We thank Ulf Axelson, Jack Edmondson, Bastian Hinterramskogler, Jose Martinez, Han Ozsoylev, 
Tarun Ramadorai, Oren Sussman, Dimitrios Tsomocos the participants in the 2010 PFN Conference and 2011 
European Financial Management Conference, three anonymous referees, and the editor for useful comments and 
valuable suggestions. We also thank S&P Capital IQ Leveraged Commentary and Data for providing us with 
information on leveraged loan spreads and leverage multiples. Miguel Sousa gratefully acknowledges financial 
support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia. 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Exiting portfolio company investments is one of the most critical choices faced by private 
equity funds. Yet little is known about the timing of exit decisions or the choice of the exit 
route – which are broadly IPO, sale to another company (“trade sale”) or sale to another 
private equity fund (“secondary exit”). The aim of this paper is to fill this gap and provide 
insights into the timing of private equity exits, and the choices made by private equity firms. 
Previous research has tended to focus on the IPO as an exit route (Lerner, 1994; 
Murray, 1994; Barry et al., 1990; Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007). However, IPOs are 
relatively uncommon, with the vast majority of private equity exits being trade or secondary 
sales. Furthermore, the recent growth of secondary buy-outs has generated considerable 
controversy. As we show, around 43% of all exits were secondary sales in recent years. Some 
commentators refer to these as “pass the parcel” deals, implying that the ultimate value of the 
company – once the music stops and the true value is revealed by a sale to someone other than 
another private equity fund – is very uncertain. Investors (the Limited Partners in the fund, or 
LPs) often complain about such deals. In particular, when an LP is an investor in both the 
selling and acquiring fund, they continue to hold a stake in the company, but have paid often 
significant transactions fees and, in some cases, will have crystalized a profit share (or 
“carried interest”, which is typically 20% of the profits) for the exiting private equity manager 
(the General Partner, or GP).  
Given the way private equity funds are incentivized, in particular the fact that they 
earn carried interest provided the fund beats a hurdle rate expressed in terms of the whole 
fund internal rate of return (IRR), the timing of the exit cannot be divorced from the route 
chosen. A rapid exit will boost the IRR, and so private equity funds will, to some extent, trade 
off the immediacy, and certainty, of an exit route with maximizing value. An important 
contribution of this paper is to analyze the time-to-exit dynamics, using a hazard function 
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framework. Although much of the literature asserts that IPOs are associated with “successful” 
exits, they do not result in quick, or certain, proceeds for private equity funds, given the 
requirement for their stakes to be locked-up for at least 6 months, and the difficulty of 
disposing of significant stakes.
2
 Secondary sales are relatively quick, the proceeds are certain 
and, unlike trade sales where competitors often emerge as the most likely purchasers, they 
seldom involve regulatory issues. Consequently, secondary sales are often welcomed by LPs. 
The controversy regarding secondary transactions is, therefore, mainly focused on the 
purchasing GP. Why are they buying a company that has already been worked on actively by 
another GP for several years?
3
 
To analyze these issues, the paper focuses on exits of European private equity 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) between January 2000 and December 2014 using a very large 
(self-collected) sample of 1,022 portfolio companies.
4
 Previous studies as Sudarsanam (2005) 
studied the exit choice for 104 UK LBOs investments and found that operating performance, 
firm size, length of holding period and whether the firm belonged to the ‘high-tech’ industry 
were all significant determinants of the exit strategy. Wang (2012) also studies UK secondary 
exits. As Wang only has data on a relatively small number of companies she does not 
differentiate between IPOs and trade sales as alternative exit routes.
5
 Using our much larger 
pan-European dataset we are able to identify the main factors that influence whether private 
                                               
2 The financial performance of LBOs that return to public markets relative to conventional IPOs has been studied 
by Cao and Lerner (2009) and Cao (2011). The latter paper provides evidence that private equity funds sell-
down their stakes in companies they take back to public markets surprisingly slowly. This confirms that an IPO 
is only, in itself, a partial exit, and the achievement of full exit can take several years in practice.  
3 Achleitner et al. (2014) and Bonini (2015) have analyzed the sources of value creation for secondary buyouts. 
Guo et al. (2011) and Harford and Kolasinski (2013) study value creation in buyouts more generally, irrespective 
of the chosen exit route. A summary of evidence regarding financial performance of buyouts in general can be 
found in Cumming et al. (2007). 
4 We focus on buyouts as entry and exit are much easier to observe compared with venture capital deals where 
there can be multiple rounds of investing and divesting. 
5 Wang (2012) only identifies 5 IPOs in her UK sample; we have 142 in our broader European sample 
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equity funds choose to exit via IPO, trade sale, or a sale to another financial buyer. Cumming 
and MacIntosh (2003b), focus mainly on the determinants of a partial exit, as opposed to a 
full exit, within the full range of exit vehicles and found that the greater the degree of 
information asymmetry between the private equity firm and the buyer, the greater the 
likelihood of a partial exit and suggested that partial exits were used as a signal of a portfolio 
company’s quality.  
This paper considers three sets of factors – which are likely to interact – that could 
influence the timing of exit and the choice of exit route.  
First, we investigate the impact of market conditions. Private equity firms want to 
achieve the best exit price possible and capital market conditions may create different 
‘windows of opportunity’. For instance, higher availability of funds in the loan market, a 
“cold” IPO market or large amounts of capital committed but not yet invested in the private 
equity industry may make secondary buy-outs the most profitable exit route. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, Axelson et al. (2013) find that a higher availability of debt (measured by 
leverage multiples – Total Debt / EBITDA6 – used in leverage buyouts) has a strong impact 
on the prices of deals as private equity firms borrow as much as they can for each deal. 
Shivdasani and Wang (2011) also document the important impact of credit markets and 
securitization, and show that the LBO boom in the years before the financial crisis was largely 
fuelled by cheap debt with few covenants.
7
 Therefore favorable debt market conditions may 
increase the likelihood of a secondary buy-out transaction.  
On the equity side, the well-documented cycles in the number of initial public 
offerings (and in the initial returns of such IPOs) also suggest the existence of windows of 
                                               
6 EBITDA – Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization. 
7 Also, as noted by Groh and Gottschalg (2011), buyout transactions tend to happen in lower risk industries, and 
so the availability of leverage becomes important to generate higher returns (even if not on a risk-adjusted basis).  
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opportunity in the public equity markets.
8
 For instance, whilst relatively few private equity 
exits to public markets were observed in the years following the financial crisis, there was a 
flurry of private equity-backed IPOs during 2014. 
The second set of factors we consider relate to the private equity fund structure. As 
noted earlier, private equity investing is generally carried out through partnerships/funds that 
have a contractually finite life, normally ten years, which can be extended only with the 
consent of the LPs. Moreover, private equity firms set up new funds approximately every 
three to five years and a good track record for timely exits as well as past performance are 
crucial to enhancing a firm’s reputation and future fundraising (Phalippou (2008)). Therefore, 
when a private equity fund is near the end of its contractual life, the GP faces pressure to 
realize investments.
9
 Consistent with this observation, Masulis and Nahata (2009) found in 
the case of trade sales that the returns of the purchasing company are, on average, higher 
when the selling private equity fund is closer to maturity. Cumming and MacIntosh (2003a) 
conjecture that as the fund approaches its maturity, there may be portfolio companies that are 
not yet ready for a public offering or a strategic sale, which may make a secondary sale 
attractive, insofar as it can avoid having to request an extension on the life fund.  
More benignly, GPs have different specializations. Some are focused on earlier stages 
of investment and others on expansion or late-stage investments, and so the recent wave of 
secondary buy-outs may have occurred because portfolio companies matured and grew and so 
were sold to other private equity firms that focus on such companies.
10
 In this case we might 
expect the two private equity firms involved in a secondary transaction should differ in terms 
                                               
8 See for instance Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984) and Lowry and Schwert (2002). 
9 Arcot et al. (2015) use an exit in year 9 or 10 of the life of the private equity fund as a sign that the GP is 
“under pressure”.  
10 “If you have different funds with different strategies, it's natural that firms will want to buy and sell to each 
other” says Ross Marshall of Dunedin Capital Partners in September 2001 and “[P]rivate equity bosses say 
secondary buy-outs can be a way to take a company to a new level” in Financial Times (4th November 2010).  
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of their experience, specialization etc. Therefore, these various characteristics such as the 
holding period of the investment, how close the fund is to maturity, and the experience or 
specialization of the private equity fund may influence exit choice.  
The final set of factors we consider relate to the portfolio company. It may be that 
some companies are more suited to particular exit routes. For instance, companies which can 
operate with high levels of debt – due to stable cash-flows or low investment needs – may be 
particularly suitable for continued private equity ownership, and so more likely to realize a 
secondary exit. And, emphasizing the point that these sets of factors can interact, the 
probability of a secondary exit for such a company would be expected to increase further 
when debt market conditions are favorable. Or it could be that firms have different monitoring 
needs, as suggested by Bienz and Leite (2008). In their model highly profitable companies – 
which require less monitoring – are more likely to be exited through an IPO whereas less 
profitable companies are exited via a trade sale. We explore whether such firm characteristics 
can explain exit choices. 
Our main results are as follows. First, our analysis suggests that capital market 
conditions are the most important determinant of the exit route. Private equity funds exploit 
the windows of opportunity that open at different times. For instance, in 2006-07 the 
extraordinary conditions in the credit market made possible the use of higher levels of debt in 
European buy-outs. Furthermore, the huge amount of capital that was committed to private 
equity before the financial crisis led to a shift in demand. Together these factors made private 
equity firms willing to pay more for portfolio companies, which increased their bargaining 
power relative to corporate acquirers, and resulted in a high proportion of secondary sales.  
Second, we find an important role for portfolio company characteristics. In particular, 
as would be expected, secondary buy-outs are more likely when the portfolio company’s 
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characteristics (higher cash flow and lower capital expenditures needs) make the company 
more able to bear significant amounts of debt in their capital structure. 
Third, regarding fund characteristics we find evidence that experienced private equity 
firms tend to sell to the less experienced, and that that secondary deals tend to happen at a 
later point in the life of the purchasing fund than primary deals. This suggests that secondary 
purchases might be a quick way of using up committed capital towards the end of the fund 
investment period. We also find evidence that IPOs are used as an early exit route, which is 
consistent with the view that IPOs can be attractive as marketing devices for raising a 
subsequent fund. However, the data also suggests that, if private equity firms cannot perform 
a public offering within a short period after the initial investment, they may prefer to exit 
through a secondary buy-out to keep their investment periods short, so as to realize high IRRs 
and facilitate fundraising. These results suggest that exit choices are, to some extent, driven 
by the private equity firms’ desire to raise their next fund, which may conflict with the interest 
of their investors.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains how the sample 
is constructed, summarizes the data, and analyzes the time-to-exit decision using a survival 
analysis framework. A multivariate econometric model for exit route choice is presented in 
section 3. Section 4 compares the characteristics of the private equity firms that participate as 
vendors or purchasers in secondary buy-outs. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Data construction and sample characteristics 
2.1 Sample construction 
One of the main issues concerning private equity research is the availability of data. Because 
private equity-backed companies are not publicly traded they do not have the same 
obligations regarding the disclosure of information as publicly traded companies. This is 
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particularly problematic for U.S. companies (except those that have issued public bonds). 
However, European companies are still required to file accounting statements in the public 
domain. In this paper, therefore, we focus on European portfolio companies, as defined by the 
country of their headquarters; we make no restrictions on the country of origin of the private 
equity fund.  
The dataset used in this paper is assembled from several sources and databases in a 
complex and multi-step process.
11
 The initial universe consists of all European private equity 
investments
12
 that exited through a public offering, a trade sale or a secondary buy-out 
between January 2000 and December 2014.
 13
 We are limited in going back before 2000 as it 
is very difficult to get accounting statements before that date. We then restrict the sample to 
those investments where it is possible to (i) identify the private equity firm(s) and fund(s) 
involved, (ii) identify the entry deal (merger/acquisition or a private placement) date, and (iii) 
obtain accounting data for the year before the exit.  
The first step in building the database is to identify private equity exits. For this two 
databases are used, S&P Capital IQ and Private Equity Insight. These databases complement 
each other and so combining them provides a broad and representative sample of private 
equity exits. Using these databases, it is possible to identify 1,023 secondary buy-outs, 1,231 
trade sales and 313 initial public offerings, in a total of 2,567 private equity exits, occurring 
between January 2000 and December 2014. 
                                               
11 A more detailed explanation of this process is available upon request. 
12 The definition of private equity investments, in the study, excludes venture capital investments. 
13 Liquidations were dropped because, in order to exclude venture capital investments the sample only includes 
exits with transaction (exit) value higher than $50m (£25m) and the low (or even zero) value of a liquidation 
would mean that none of these transactions would have made the cut off. Buy-backs were dropped because they 
either are used as a subsequent exit (after an initial public offering) or in small, venture capital type investments. 
And finally, dividend recapitalizations were dropped because they are not an exit per se, but combine a cash 
distribution with a balance sheet restructuring.  
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The second step involves gathering detailed transaction/exit data. Thomson Venture 
Expert (TVE) and S&P Capital IQ are used to identify the selling private equity firms and 
funds involved in each transaction and their characteristics, such as the year the private equity 
was founded, the fund vintage year and the fund size. When more than one private equity firm 
is identified in the same transaction, if one of the private equity firms led the transaction 
(retained a higher percentage of shares on the deal) only the information about the leader and 
their fund is used. If none of the private equity firms receive more shares than the other(s) or 
no information about that aspect is available, information on all private equity firms and funds 
data is obtained and the data on firm and fund characteristics is averaged. 
S&P Capital IQ, TVE and Zephyr
14
 are used to obtain information about the entry deal 
date. Accounting data is collected from FAME, AMADEUS and ORBIS,
 15
 and occasionally 
from S&P Capital IQ. Only the deals for which accounting data regarding the portfolio 
company is available for at least the year before the exit are retained. Information about the 
portfolio company’s founding year is collected from S&P Capital IQ, TVE or the Internet.  
From the 2,567 private equity exits identified in the first step we are able to collect the 
data required for 446 secondary buy-outs, 434 trade sales (to either publicly-listed or private 
companies) and 142 public offerings, producing a total of 1,022 private equity exits. Figure 1 
shows the exit route distribution by year. These exits represent our sample for the remainder 
of the paper. Table 1 reports the nationality (Panel A) and the industry (Panel B) of the 
sample portfolio companies and Table 2 shows the (selling) private equity firms involved. 28 
European countries and more than 300 private equity firms are represented in this sample, 
                                               
14 Zephyr contains information on deals, such as merger and acquisitions and IPOs. 
15 FAME, AMADEUS and ORBIS contain information on public and private companies for the UK & Ireland, 
Europe and the rest of the world (respectively). FAME, AMADEUS, ORBIS and Zephyr are managed by Bureau 
van Dijk. 
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with the UK accounting for almost one-half of the portfolio companies. We believe this to be 
the most comprehensive sample of European private equity exits yet collected. 
Information about the local stock market return index is collected from the relevant 
stock exchange websites. Capital committed to private equity funds and not yet invested is 
obtained from Preqin. Finally, three different measures of debt market conditions are 
collected. The FED tightening Index
16
 is collected from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System website and represents the net percentage of domestic banks that have 
tightened standards for Commercial and Industrial (C&I) Loans in a quarter. Finally, monthly 
interest margins on leveraged loans and leverage multiples in European buy-outs are obtained 
from S&P Capital IQ's Leveraged Commentary and Data (LCD). 
2.2 Summary statistics 
Table 3 provides summary information for the 1,022 deals. The average holding period of all 
deals is just over 4 years. This is slightly longer than the 3.7 years found by Schwienbacher 
(2008a) and in the middle of the 3-5 year interval suggested by Fenn et al. (1997). On 
average, private equity funds make their investments about two years into the life of the fund 
(25.0 months) and exit their investments after around six years (76.2 months). Not 
surprisingly, holding periods increased noticeably after the 2008 financial crisis. The average 
(median) fund size is $938 million ($456 million) while the private equity firms have on 
average, at the time of the exit, around 20 years of experience.
17
 
                                               
16 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. For more information on this survey, see 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey. 
17 If the private equity firm was founded before 1970, we use 1970 as the founding year, as little activity existed 
in the European private equity industry before that date. 
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Regarding the target portfolio companies, in the year before the exit they have average 
(median) book assets of $328 million ($97 million), sales of $320 million ($109 million) and 
EBIT of $25 million ($9.3 million). 
In Table 4 we differentiate between exit routes. Panel A shows that investments exited 
through a secondary buy-out are held for an average (median) of 52.7 months (49.5 months), 
compared with 51.8 months (48.5) and 44.7 months (42.2) for trade sales and IPOs 
respectively. The holding period differences between the sub-sample of deals exited through 
an IPO and the sub-sample of deals exited through a secondary buyout are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Panel A also reports the maturity of the private equity fund at the 
point of exit. Secondary buy-outs are exited later in the fund life (78 months) than 
investments exited through a trade sale (76.5 months) or through an IPO (70 months). The 
difference between IPOs and secondary buy-outs is statistically significant. IPOs tend to be 
used more by larger funds (more than $1 billion), but the experience of private equity firms is 
not related to the choice of exit route. 
Table 4 Panel B provides summary information on specific characteristics of portfolio 
companies. Companies that exit through a secondary buy-out are significantly older (40.2 
years) than those using a trade sale (34.7 years) or an IPO (39.6 years). Consistent with the 
finding of Sudarsanam (2005), companies using secondary exits are, in the year before the 
exit, also more profitable – having an average (median) EBIT margin (EBIT/Turnover) equal 
to 10.7% (14.2%). By contrast, those portfolio companies that exit through an IPO tend to be 
larger, to invest the highest proportion of total assets (15.4%) and have the lowest profitability 
in terms of EBIT margin. 
These results suggest that exit via a secondary buy-out is more likely to be used for 
mature portfolio companies with higher capacity to generate cash-flow and earnings (to 
support significant levels of debt) and for companies that require less investment.  
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Axelson et al. (2013) show that the macro economy is an important determinant of 
exit route. We summarize macroeconomic conditions at the time of exit in Table 4 Panel C. 
IPOs tend to be used after periods of strong returns: markets increase, on average, by 4.5% 
during the 3-6 month period before the public offering.
18
 This is consistent with the existence 
of IPO windows of opportunity when shareholders take advantage of “hot” IPO markets. 
Secondary buy-outs are most frequent during periods when private equity fund have raised 
(but not yet spent) large amounts of capital, and when credit is cheap and lending conditions 
are loose. This tends to suggest the existence of secondary buy-out ‘windows of opportunity’ 
during which the secondary exit route leads to higher returns. 
Table 5 summarizes how exit routes vary over the fund life. Masulis and Nahata 
(2009) conclude that private equity investors face a liquidity pressure as their funds approach 
maturity. In our sample 64% of IPO exits happen during the first six years of a fund, 26% 
during the seventh and eighth years, and only 10% happen after the eight year.  In the case of 
secondary buyouts and trade sales, the majority of exits also happen between the fifth and the 
eighth years of the fund’s life, but 6% occur after the tenth year.  
 
2.3 Hazard Functions 
In order to understand exit dynamics during the life of the fund, we next analyze the time-to-
exit using a survival analysis framework, similar to that employed by Giot and Schwienbacher 
                                               
18 All macroeconomics variables are recorded in the quarter before the exit because such decisions are made 
some time before the transaction closes. 
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(2007).
19
 The hazard function gives the conditional instantaneous probability of exit given 
that the deal has not been exited at that specific time (the hazard rate)
20
 
 
       (1) 
 
where S(t) = Pr (T>t) = 1 – F(t) (survivor function) 
F(t) = Pr (T≤t) (exit time distribution function) 
f(t) = dF(t) / dt (density function of exit time distribution) 
 
The hazard functions for each exit route are shown in Figure 2, and provide some interesting 
evidence on the dynamics of the exit process. First, the exit probabilities are broadly similar 
for the first 90 months of the fund, although trade sales are generally less likely during this 
initial period. Second, thereafter the probability of conducting an IPO drops off sharply, with 
secondary buyouts becoming by far the most likely exit route. Third, as funds head towards 
final liquidation, the remaining companies are sold to trade purchasers, with no instances of 
IPOs or secondary sales after the 10-year point.  
The survival analysis can be extended using a Cox proportional hazard model
21
 where 
hazard rates depend on a set of covariates that can be viewed as explanatory variables: 
 
                                               
19 Contrary to their model, the holding period variable is not right-censored since all deals have been exited at 
the time of data collection. For more detail on survival analysis and/or hazard models see Giot and 
Schwienbacher (2007) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005). 
20 Also called the intensity function, the conditional failure rate or the inverse Mills ratio, “is the instantaneous 
rate of failure” (Cleves et al., 2010) 
21 This model is a semi-parametric model that makes no assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard 
function, 0(t), which does not have to be specified. This fact makes the Cox model considerably flexible and 
widely used. 
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                 (2) 
 
The explanatory variables we include are the private equity firm experience, the fund size and 
maturity when the deal was initiated, the portfolio company’s size (proxied by the total book 
value of assets), and the portfolio company’s age at beginning of the deal. Industry, exit year 
and country fixed effect are also included. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. The model shows – as expected, given 
the limited life of a fund – that investments initiated later in the life of the fund take less time 
to be exited. Larger funds tend to exit their investments more quickly. Regarding portfolio 
company characteristics, older companies tend to be exited more quickly, and larger portfolio 
companies exited more slowly. We find no evidence that the experience of the GP has a 
significant effect on the speed of exit.  
This section has looked in detail at the timing of the exit decision, for each exit route. 
In the next section we switch focus to the exit decision itself. 
3.  Regression results 
We hypothesize that the choice of exit route depends on three groups of factors relating to the 
investor, the portfolio company and the market environment. In this section we use a discrete 
choice Trinomial Logistic Model to analyze the exit route decision.  
3.1 Trinomial Logistic Model and variables 
The exit route probability model is based on a trinomial logistic regression using the exit 
routes as the dependent variable, which assumes the value 0 if the exit route is a secondary 
buy-out, 1 if it is a trade sale, and 2 if it is an IPO. Deal and private equity investor 
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characteristics (x), portfolio company characteristics (w) and macroeconomic environment 
factors (z) are used as independent variables to explain the choice of exit route: 
yi = x’ii + w’ii + z’ii +ui       (3) 
The x variables include the fund maturity, represented by the number of months (at exit) since 
the vintage year
22
, the fund size, and the age of the private equity firm at the exit date. The w 
variables include company size (represented by total assets), company age, the EBIT margin 
(as a measure of profitability), the turnover-assets ratio (as a measure of capital intensity), the 
CAPEX-assets ratio (as a measure of investment intensity), and the growth rate of turnover. 
All these accounting variables are measured in the last year before the exit.  
Previous work has suggested how these variables may impact on the exit decision. 
Pagano et al. (1998) show that the “larger companies are more likely to go public”, mostly 
because they face less direct (administrative) and indirect (underpricing) costs. Gompers 
(1995), Cumming and Macintosh (2003a) and Schwienbacher (2008b) have shown that, due 
to fixed costs, only companies above a threshold dimension should be expected to be exiting 
through a public offering. Ritter (1991) found a significant inverse relationship between 
underpricing and the age of the company in a public offering, which is consistent with 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) who showed that, in equilibrium, firms go public only when 
a sufficient amount of information about them has accumulated in the public domain.  
Finally, regarding the macroeconomic environment at the time of the exit (z), the 
return on the local stock market index
23
 is included as a proxy for the state of the IPO market. 
                                               
22 As the exact date of the fund close is unknown, we use July 1 for all funds. Detailed descriptions of all 
variables and definitions are presented in the appendix. 
23 Although, it is possible for a portfolio company to be floated on overseas stock exchanges, the local stock 
exchange is normally the first choice because it is where potential investors have more information about the 
company and so it is easier to market the initial public offering. 
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The Fed tightening index is used as proxy for the availability of capital in the credit market. 
Finally, the amount of capital available to private equity investors, sometimes referred to as 
“dry-powder”, is included to proxy the competitive state of the private equity market.  
Dummies variables that control for industry fixed effects and country fixed effects (in 
the models without macro country-level variables) are also included. The existence of outliers 
made some distributions relatively skewed and could lead to a distortion of statistical tests. As 
a result some variables are measured in natural logarithms or are winsorized.
24
  
3.2. Empirical results 
Table 7 shows the results for the trinomial model. The secondary buy-out exit is the 
comparison class. Separate equations relate the probability of a trade sale to the probability of 
a secondary buy-out and the probability of an IPO to the probability of a secondary buy-out.
25
 
Industry fixed effects are included in each model, and country fixed effects are included in 
Models 1 and 2, in which macroeconomic variables do not appear.   
We start by including each set of explanatory variables separately. These models (1 – 
3) suggest that trade sales are more likely to be used (relative to secondary sales) by more 
experienced private equity firms, by smaller funds, at an earlier stage in the fund life, and for 
                                               
24 Logs were used for fund maturity, fund size, private equity firm age, portfolio company age and total assets. 
Winsorization (at the 5% and 95% points) was used only for variables expressed in percentage points, such as 
EBIT margin, asset turnover ratio, CAPEX over total assets, and turnover growth.  
25 Although the exact value of the coefficient associated with any variable cannot be directly interpreted, a 
positive coefficient in the first (second) equation means that as the independent (exogenous) variable increases 
the ratio “probability of a trade sale (public offering) / probability of a secondary buy-out” increase, i.e., the 
probability of a trade sale (public offering) increases related with the probability of a secondary buy-out. By 
contrast, a negative coefficient associated to any variable means that the probability of a secondary buy-out 
related to the probability of a trade sale (public offering) increases as the independent (exogenous) variable 
increases. 
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smaller portfolio companies with lower margins.
26
. The probability of an IPO is higher earlier 
in the life of the fund, and for portfolio companies with higher CAPEX intensity and turnover 
growth. We also find that the probability of an IPO decreases with portfolio company 
profitability (as measured by EBIT margins), which contradicts the ‘monitoring hypothesis’.  
These results suggest that the attractiveness of a secondary sale increases for companies with 
high margins and lower capital requirements – both of which would support the higher debt 
levels that would be used by secondary buyers. 
Macroeconomic conditions are also found to be significant: the probability of 
choosing an IPO, over a secondary sale, is higher when the stock market has been increasing, 
when credit conditions have been getting tighter and when capital committed to private equity 
decreases.
27
 Secondary sales are more likely to be chosen over trade sales when capital 
committed to private equity is higher, as would be expected. 
The three sets of explanatory variables are combined in Model 4, and most of the 
conclusions of the earlier models are confirmed. The main difference is that the fund 
characteristics generally become less significant. On the other hand, controlling for the 
                                               
26 One additional year of experience of the private equity firm (around the mean of 20.3 years) increases the ratio 
“probability of a trade sale /probability of a secondary buy-out” by around 1.84%. An increase of private equity 
fund size by $1 million (around the mean of $938 million) decreases the ratio “probability of a trade sale 
/probability of a secondary buy-out” by around 0.015%. To exit the investment one month later in the fund life 
(around the mean of 76.2 months) decreases the ratio “probability of a trade sale /probability of a secondary buy-
out” by around 0.46%. An increase of portfolio company EBIT margin by 1 percentage point decreases the ratio 
“probability of a trade sale /probability of a secondary buy-out” by around 1.88%. 
27 A stock market return higher in 1 percentage point increases the ratio “probability of a public offering 
/probability of a secondary buy-out” by around 5.65%.  An increase of the net number of commercial banks 
tightening standards for corporate loans higher in 1 percentage points increases the ratio “probability of a public 
offering /probability of a secondary buy-out” by around 1.20%. An increase of the capital commitment to private 
equity higher in 1 percentage point decreases the ratio “probability of a public offering /probability of a 
secondary buy-out” by around 8.89%. 
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portfolio company and macroeconomic variables increases the significance of fund size for 
the choice between IPOs and secondary sales: larger funds are more likely to choose IPOs.  
In summary, our results suggest that market conditions, which provide various 
windows of opportunity for GPs, are consistently important across all the specifications. 
Loosening credit conditions increase the probability of secondary sales, and periods of strong 
stock market performance and smaller commitments to private equity increase the probability 
of IPOs. Such effects are particularly pronounced for portfolio companies with a high debt 
capacity. Axelson et al. (2013) found such macroeconomic factors were critical determinants 
of the pricing and capital structure of LBOs; our results show that they also have a significant 
impact on the way deals are exited.  
4.  Selling versus purchasing private equity firm and fund characteristics 
To this point we have focused on the exit choice for all LBOs in our sample. However, in this 
section we focus on the secondary buyouts and compare the characteristics of the selling and 
buying private equity firms, and the point the primary and secondary transactions took place 
in the life of the purchasing fund. For both the selling and purchasing private equity firms we 
gather data from Thomson One on firm age, the total number of private equity funds set up 
and the total amount raised, up to the date of each transaction. We further distinguish between 
private equity funds in general (including venture capital) and buyout funds.   
Table 8, Panel A compares the private equity firms on each side of the secondary 
transactions. The results show that the selling private equity firm is, on average, 1.3 years 
older than the purchasing firm, and this difference is significant at the 5% level. In terms of 
fund formation, the selling firm had set up an average of 12.6 private equity funds – 1.6 more 
than the purchasing firm. Focusing only on the buyout funds the difference is slightly higher 
and statistically significant. Regarding the amounts raised, the total for all fund types is very 
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similar. There is, nonetheless, some evidence that selling private equity firms tend to be 
somewhat more experienced than purchasing firms. 
We also consider, in Table 8 Panel B, whether sellers and purchasers differ in terms of 
the point in the fund life at which they buy the given firms. We find that the initial purchases 
occur, on average, two years after the vintage year. Interestingly, the secondary purchases 
happen, on average, significantly later at two and a half year after the vintage year. We also 
compare the size of the selling and purchasing funds. Purchasing funds are significantly larger 
than selling funds. However, to some extent this simply reflects the fact that capital 
committed to the private equity sector and buyout fund sizes were steadily increasing over our 
sample period.  
This comparison of the parties involved in secondary transactions provides some 
evidence that, across our sample of deals, the experienced private equity firms tend to sell to 
the less experienced. The previous section provides little evidence to support the view that 
secondary transactions are more likely for those companies that have grown rapidly and could 
benefit from a new private equity owner to take them to the next level. If anything, the faster 
growing companies tended to exit to trade sales and IPOs. Therefore, the choice of secondary 
exit seems to be driven more by the fund characteristic than portfolio company factors. The 
fact that secondary deals tend to happen at a later point in the life of the purchasing fund than 
primary deals is intriguing. Most private equity funds claim that they focus mainly on primary 
deals, and our findings are consistent with funds turning to secondary transactions when they 
are unable to source sufficient primary deals. This would suggest, in general, that secondary 
buyouts should under-perform primary transactions. Although returns are not the focus of this 
paper, Degeorge et al. (2015) confirm this conjecture. They analyze the performance of 
secondary buyouts and find that, on average, they under-perform relative to primary deals. 
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This is mainly driven by deals that occur later in the life of the purchasing fund – which they 
describe as “going for broke”.  
5.  Conclusions 
Using a new and comprehensive dataset consisting of all European companies exited by 
private equity firms between January 2000 and December 2014, this paper analyzes the 
determinants of exit timing and the exit route. We pay particular attention to the factors that 
might explain the growth of secondary transactions between private equity funds, which 
comprise 43% of the exits in our sample. 
 We find evidence that the choice between IPOs and secondary buyouts depends 
heavily on the conditions in the debt and equity market. When stock markets have been rising 
strongly, the use of IPOs, relative to secondary sales, increases. When debt is abundant and 
cheap, and when private equity firms have a lot of committed capital to deploy, we observe an 
increase in secondary buyouts. Furthermore, these effects are more pronounced for portfolio 
companies with a higher capacity to service debt – for instance, companies with higher levels 
of cash-flow and profitability, and with lower capital expenditure requirements. The choice 
between secondary buyouts and trade sales is influenced more by portfolio company 
characteristics, with trade sales being more likely for smaller companies that have 
experienced stronger growth. 
The academic literature has tended to view IPOs as the “successful” exit route, but our 
results question whether such status is warranted. In contrast, many people view secondary 
buyouts with suspicion, but from the perspective of the selling private equity funds – and their 
investors – secondary buyouts have many attractions. The price is arrived at through an 
auction involving multiple potential purchasers. At closing the purchaser pays the full price, 
and the selling fund knows exactly what returns will be achieved. Investors receive their 
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money back quickly thereafter. Therefore, to some extent, private equity firms provide 
liquidity to each other via secondary sales.  
Contrast this process with the uncertainties of an IPO.  At the start of the IPO process 
an investment bank gives an indication as to the likely price, but there is uncertainty about the 
outcome until the day before the bookbuilding closes. Often there are last-minute changes in 
the issue price, as the investment bank juggles the interests of the vendor and its buy-side 
clients. This inherent conflict of interest may go some way to explain the systemic 
underpricing of IPOs (see, for instance, Jenkinson and Jones (2009)), which GPs very much 
view as ‘carried interest left on the table’. At the IPO, the private equity owner is only able to 
sell a proportion of their holding, and is subject to a lengthy lock-up on the remainder. Selling 
down the remaining (often large) stakes can take long periods of time. Therefore, proceeds are 
highly uncertain and investors do not obtain their money for many months or years after the 
IPO. From the perspective of the GP and their investors, an IPO is not an exit per se; it is a 
route to an exit.  
Therefore, secondary sales have strong attractions from the viewpoint of the selling 
private equity funds. However, a rather different case needs to be made to justify secondary 
purchases. When we compare the characteristics of the private equity firms involved on both 
sides of secondary transactions, we find that the more experienced private equity firms tend to 
sell to the less experienced. We also find that secondary deals tend to happen at a later point 
in the life of the purchasing fund than the primary deals. This suggests that funds may tend to 
buy in secondary transactions when they cannot source good primary deals. This is consistent 
with the finding of Degeorge at al. (2015) that secondary deals bought later in the life of a 
fund tend to underperform.  
In conclusion, our results provide support for the ‘window of opportunity’ hypothesis, 
and reinforce the recent work by Axelson et al. (2013) who find similarly strong effects of 
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market conditions on capital structure and pricing of leveraged buyouts. While the use of 
secondary buyouts varies with capital market conditions, and according to the portfolio and 
fund characteristics we identify, we expect them to continue to be one of the most commonly 
observed exit routes in the future. Private equity funds are highly incentivized to sell their 
portfolio companies for the highest price, with the lowest risk, and with the shortest delay in 
receiving the proceeds. Selling to another private equity fund often achieves these goals.   
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Appendix: Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Holding period (months) (exit day - entry day) / 30 
Fund maturity (months) 
[(day 1 / exit month / exit year) - (day 1 / 
month 7 / vintage year)] / 30 
Fund size ($m) closed fund size 
Private equity firm age at exit (seller) 
(years) (exit year - pe firm founding year + 1) 
Portfolio company age at exit (years) (exit year - pc founding year + 1) 
Turnover ($m) 
(total sales value in the last profit and loss 
statement before the exit date) x 12 / 
(number of months in the statement)  [annual 
equivalent] 
Total assets ($m) 
total assets value in the last accounting 
statement before the exit date 
EBIT ($m) 
(total EBIT value in the last profit and loss 
statement before the exit date) x 12 / 
(number of months in the statement)  [annual 
equivalent] 
EBIT margin (x100) (annual equivalent EBIT) / Total sales x 100 
CAPEX ($m) 
total fixed assets value in the last accounting 
statement before the exit date – total fixed 
assets value in the second from the last 
accounting statement before the exit date + 
depreciation and amortizations value in the 
last profit and loss statement before the exit 
date 
CAPEX / Total Assets (x100) CAPEX / Total Assets x 100 
Local stock market return (x100) 
Local index stock exchange return x 100 
between six and three months before the exit 
Capital commitment index return (x100) 
Preqin capital commitment index return x 
100 in the quarter before the exit 
Margins on BB loans 
"drawn margins on leveraged institutional 
term loans BB" in the quarter before the exit 
Fed index 
'net percentage of domestic respondents 
tightening standards for C&I Loans' x 100 in 
the quarter before the exit 
Leverage multiple 
Leverage multiple in the 3
rd
 month before 
the exit 
Note: All values originally not in USD converted at historical exchange rate 
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Figure 1 – Exits distribution by route and year 
This figure shows our sample of 1,022 private equity exits by route and year. 
 
Figure 2 – Hazard functions by exit 
This figure shows the hazard functions for the IPO, secondary buy-outs and trade sale exits. The hazard function 
gives the conditional instantaneous probability of exit given that the deal has not been exited at that specific 
time. 
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Table 1: Sample description  
This table gives details about the 1,022 exits of European companies, which occurred between January 2000 and 
December 2014. Panel A sorts the sample by portfolio company nationality (according to the location of their 
headquarters) and according to whether their exit route was an initial public offering (IPO), secondary sale to 
another private equity fund (Sec) or a trade sale to a corporate acquirer (TS). Nationality means the country 
where the portfolio company has its headquarters. Panel B sorts the sample by broad industrial classification and 
by exit route. 
 
Panel A: Nationality of portfolio companies and exit routes 
 
Panel B: Industrial classification of portfolio companies 
 
  
IPO Sec TS Total
United Kingdom 64 198 182 444
France 13 84 53 150
Sweden 11 23 36 70
Germany 12 28 27 67
Italy 4 34 27 65
Spain 3 14 19 36
Netherlands 3 15 16 34
Norway 8 13 12 33
Finland 2 8 16 26
Denmark 2 10 7 19
Belgium 2 5 8 15
Ireland 5 1 4 10
Austria 4 2 2 8
Other 15 9 11 25 45
Country
Exit route
Industry IPO Sec TS Total
Agriculture and Mining 4 6 12 22
Construction 2 8 9 19
Manufacturing 55 182 178 415
Transportation and Communication 10 33 51 94
Retail and Wholesale Trade 22 67 47 136
Financial and Other services 49 150 137 336
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Table 2: Sample description: Exits by selling private equity firm  
This table reports the selling private equity firm and exit routes used in the 1,022 exits of European companies 
which occurred between January 2000 and December 2014. If more than one private equity firm was involved 
and none was the leader (got a higher percentage of shares on the deal) all private equity firms were considered. 
 
 
 
 
  
IPO Sec TS Total
3i Group 15 34 41 90
Bridgepoint Capital 2 20 18 40
Apax Partners 11 11 15 37
Barclays Private Equity 1 18 8 27
EQT Partners 9 9 9 27
CVC Capital Partners 6 9 9 24
Cinven 3 10 8 21
Industri Kapital 2 9 9 20
Nordic Capital 4 7 8 19
Carlyle Group 3 9 7 19
Candover Investments 2 8 7 17
Permira 3 9 5 17
Other 297 87 340 317 744
Private equity firm
Exit route
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the entire sample 
This table reports the summary statistics for deal holding period, characteristics of private equity investors and 
funds involved, target portfolio company’s age, size and operating performance, at the time of exit, for 1,022 
deals exited between January 2000 and December 2014 (dollars in millions).  
  
 
  
Average Median Std. Deviation N
Panel A: Deal and PE investor
Holding period (months) 51.2   48.1   25.8   1022   
Fund maturity (months) 76.2   72.9   31.5   979   
Fund size $938.0   $455.7   $1,360.4   981   
PE age at exit (years) 20.3   20.0   9.7   1022   
Panel B: Portfolio company
Age at exit (years) 37.8   21.5   41.6   1022   
Total assets $328.0   $97.4   $846.5   1022   
Turnover $320.2   $108.7   $819.1   1019   
EBIT $25.5   $9.3   $81.7   1022   
EBIT margin 8.94% 13.29% 12.33% 1017   
Asset turnover ratio 1.51   1.23   1.29   1019   
CAPEX $23.4   $5.1   $151.2   942   
CAPEX / Total Assets 9.48% 6.92% 12.01% 941   
Variables
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for each exit subsample 
This table reports descriptive statistics and the macroeconomics variables at the time of the exit for the 446 deals 
exited through a secondary buy-out, the 434 deals exited through a trade sale and the 142 deals exited through a 
public offering, between January 2000 and December 2014 involving European companies. In the last two cases, 
the table also reports the differences to the sub-sample of deals exited through a secondary buyout, using the 
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test. *, **, *** indicate that the two sub-samples are 
significantly different at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The accounting data in Panel B relates to the 
last full-year accounts prior to the exit. All reported dollar values are in millions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Deal and PE investor
Holding period (months) 52.7   49.5   51.8   48.5   -1.16 44.7   42.2   -3.82 ***
Fund maturity (months) 78.1   74.2   76.5   72.7   -1.10 69.8   68.2   -2.73 ***
Fund size $920.0   $458.7   $880.8   $416.0   -1.21 $1,168.5   $608.0   2.09 **
PE age at exit (years) 20.0   20.0   20.6   20.0   0.76 20.2   20.0   0.15
Panel B: Portfolio company
Age at exit (years) 40.2   25.0   34.7   18.0   -3.05 *** 39.6   17.5   -1.70 *
Total assets $290.4   $113.0   $262.7   $72.2   -4.42 *** $645.9   $122.3   -0.42
Turnover $292.7   $135.6   $263.8   $81.9   -4.79 *** $582.1   $149.8   -0.37
EBIT $24.3   $12.5   $18.4   $6.5   -6.10 *** $51.1   $9.4   -1.52
EBIT margin 10.7% 14.2% 8.3% 12.7% -2.88 *** 5.4% 12.4% -3.53 ***
Asset turnover ratio 1.5   1.2   1.6   1.3   0.77 1.4   1.1   -1.48
CAPEX $20.6   $5.9   $18.5   $3.8   -2.62 *** $48.0   $11.9   2.41 ***
CAPEX / Total Assets 8.5% 6.0% 8.6% 6.9% 0.20 15.4% 11.6% 4.83 ***
Panel C: Macroeconomics
Local stock market return 2.5% 3.3% 2.2% 2.8% -0.89 4.5% 3.7% 1.67 *
Capital commitment index return 3.1% 4.0% 2.5% 2.7% -2.74 *** 2.6% 3.0% -2.20 **
Margins on BB loans 2.36p.p. 2.03p.p. 2.55p.p. 2.31p.p. 4.03 *** 2.47p.p. 2.27p.p. 2.16 **
Fed tightening index -4.5% -8.8% -1.4% -8.8% 1.10 1.0% -8.8% 1.93 *
Leverage multiple 5.01   4.98   4.92   4.79   -2.27 ** 4.88   4.82   -2.39 **
Variables
Trade sale IPO
z z
Secondary buy-out
Average Median Average Median Average Median
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Table 5: Exit distribution along the private equity fund life 
This table reports the distribution of the different exits (secondary buy-out, trade sale and public offering) along 
the fund’s life.  
 
 
Table 6: Cox model 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of a Cox proportional hazard model for all and each of the exits 
(secondary buy-out, trade sale and public offering). The explain variable is the investment time-to-exit (holding 
period) and the private equity firm experience (proxy by the firm’s age at beginning of the deal), the private 
equity fund size, fund maturity when the deal was initiated, the portfolio company’s size (proxy by the total book 
value of assets in the last year before the deal was initiated), the portfolio company’s age at beginning of the deal 
are used as explicative variables. Country, exit year and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are 
reported under the coefficients in parenthesis and *, **, *** indicate levels that are significantly different from 
zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
  
Secondary buy-out Trade sale IPO
1-2 0.04   0.05   0.08   
3-4 0.19   0.20   0.25   
5-6 0.34   0.34   0.31   
7-8 0.25   0.22   0.26   
9-10 0.12   0.11   0.07   
+10 0.06   0.07   0.03   
Exit
Years since the vintage year
ln (PE firm age at entry) -0.058 -0.077 0.000 -0.146
(0.048) (0.073) (0.088) (0.184)
ln (Fund maturity at entry) 0.172 *** 0.141 ** 0.164 *** 0.544 ***
(0.038) (0.061) (0.059) (0.167)
ln (Fund size) 0.143 *** 0.094 * 0.193 ** 0.351 **
(0.033) (0.049) (0.055) (0.144)
ln (Portfolio company age at entry) 0.054 ** 0.071 * -0.027 0.204 **
(0.024) (0.039) (0.041) (0.082)
ln (Portfolio company total assets) -0.071 *** -0.022 -0.106 ** -0.178 **
(0.026) (0.043) (0.046) (0.073)
Country and exit year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations
LR Chi
2 150.45 *** 55.26 * 82.44 *** 105.95 **
386 369882
Exit
Included Included Included Included
Trade Sale IPO
127
Included Included Included Included
Variables
Secondary buy-outAll
33 
 
Table 7: Trinomial Logistic Model 
This table reports the maximum-likelihood trinomial logistic regression results for the full sample of 1,022 exits. 
The dependent variable is the exit route and the secondary buy-out exit is the base (comparing) group. 
Exogenous variables are defined in Appendix. Standard errors are reported under the coefficients in parenthesis. 
*, **, *** indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. + indicates a winsorized variable at 0.05 
and 0.95 percentiles. 
 
 
 
  
-0.353 ** -0.538 ** 0.039 -0.017
(0.165) (0.228) (0.182) (0.273)
-0.140 ** 0.124 -0.011 0.277 ***
(0.058) (0.087) (0.065) (0.103)
0.371 *** -0.032 0.227 0.010
(0.141) (0.198) (0.147) (0.224)
-0.112 -0.018 -0.081 -0.030
(0.079) (0.118) (0.080) (0.117)
-0.166 *** 0.022 -0.148 ** -0.022
(0.057) (0.081) (0.060) (0.085)
-0.019 *** -0.033 *** -0.021 *** -0.033 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
-0.034 -0.090 -0.016 -0.026
(0.091) (0.134) (0.092) (0.133)
-0.004 0.038 *** -0.005 0.035 ***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
0.004 0.007 ** 0.005 * 0.009 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
0.008 0.055 *** 0.009 0.049 ***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016)
-0.086 *** -0.093 ** -0.102 *** -0.089 *
(0.031) (0.045) (0.034) (0.050)
0.004 0.012 ** 0.003 0.013 **
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations
LR Chi
2
Model 4
TS IPOTS IPO TS IPO
ln (fund maturity)
TS IPO
Variables
D
e
a
l 
a
n
 P
E
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
193.25***
972
Included
M
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
s 
v
a
r.
Local stock index return
Capital commitment index return
Fed Tightening Index
ln (fund size)
ln (pe age)
EBIT margin
+
ln (total assets)
P
C
 v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
CAPEX / Total Assets
+
ln (pc age)
Turnover growth
+
184.16*** 205.8***224.96***
876936 1008
IncludedIncluded Included
Asset turnover ratio
+
Included Included Not included Not included
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Table 8: Secondary buy-out – Sellers and buyers descriptive statistics 
This table compares characteristics of the selling private equity firm and funds and the purchasing private equity 
firm and funds involved in secondary buy-outs. The average and median difference is calculated only for the 
observations in which both selling and purchasing private equity firm/fund data is available. Significance levels 
of average difference are based on two-tailed Student t-tests, while significance levels of median differences are 
based on a one-sample Wilcoxon sign-rank tests. *, **, *** indicate levels that are significantly different from 
zero at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
 
 
N Average Median N Average Median N
Panel A: Private Equity Firm
PE age at exit/entry (years) 446 20.0 20.0 438 18.7 19.0 438 1.3 ** 2.0 **
Total funds 404 12.6 7 391 11.0 6 356 1.6 * 1.0
BO funds 403 6.4 5 368 5.4 4 356 1.2 *** 1.0 ***
Total amount 404 $8,003 $2,838 391 $7,986 $2,134 332 -$227 $5
Total BO funds amount 403 $5,603 $2,127 387 $5,262 $1,066 352 $268 $179 *
Panel B: Private Equity Fund
Fund maturity at entry (months) 420 25.7 22.3 295 31.9 26.9 274 -6.5 *** -9.1 ***
Fund size 425 $920 $459 277 $1,735 $696 261 -$1,001 *** -$311 ***
Variables
Selling PE Purchasing PE
Average Median
Difference
